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Metaphysics, Intuitions and Physics
1
--Draft 
 
1. Introduction 
Ladyman and Ross (2007) do not think that contemporary metaphysics is in good standing. 
However, they do think that there is a version of metaphysics that can be made to work—
provided we approach it using appropriate principles. My aim in this paper is to undermine 
some of their arguments against contemporary metaphysics as it is currently practiced. 
2. A partial defence of contemporary metaphysics and its method 
In contemporary metaphysics there is a reasonably well-established methodology. It is not the 
only methodology available. I do not say that it’s a good methodology. But it is well 
established. The methodology that I have in mind is Lewisian. It is ‘weights and balances’ 
metaphysics. Very roughly, the idea is this. We work out a range of internally consistent 
theories. We must then select a theory from this pool of theories to be adopted as our 
preferred theory. To do this, we must weigh the pros and cons of the theories in our pool. If a 
theory is particularly parsimonious, that’s a benefit of the theory. If a theory offers great 
explanatory power, that’s a benefit of the theory. If, however, a theory is particularly 
inelegant or ad hoc, then that’s a cost of the theory. Similarly, if a theory looks like it 
contradicts our best physics, then that is a cost of the view.
2
 
Of central concern to us here is the fact that whether or not a theory is intuitive is also taken 
to be salient to our choice of theory. Some claim that if a theory is particularly intuitive or 
commonsensical, then that is a benefit of the theory; if a theory is particularly 
counterintuitive then that is a cost of the theory. In quite a range of different cases it can seem 
as if the only evidence being given in favour of a particular theory in philosophy is that it is 
intuitive. As Ladyman and Ross put it, for ‘neo‐scholastic metaphysicians’ intuitive 
judgments are typically all that ever passes for evidence’ (2007: 15). 
For my own part, I think that’s an overstatement. But set that to one side. Let us allow—as 
we surely should—that philosophers frequently write as if intuition is being appealed to as 
evidence. Some are forceful in the claim that they are appealing to common-sense, or 
intuition, and that they take it to be evidence in favour of their theory.
3
 Consider the 
following: 
 
‘What it is for some statement to be commonsensical is just for it to seem obviously 
true to most sane human beings…All I insist upon is that something’s being 
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 Those who explicitly describe this methodology as one present and available in contemporary metaphysics 
include: Dyke and Maclaurin (2011: 296), Lewis (1986: 3-5) and Sider (2009: 385). Markosian (2008) is, as a 
whole, a nice example of a philosopher engaged in an extensive programme of weighing and balancing the costs 
and benefits of a view—pp. 359-60 even gives us a table laying out the costs and benefits of all of the views 
under discussion. 
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commonsensical must be allowed to count very strongly in its favor’ (Zimmerman, 
2008: 222) 
If it is true, as I think it is, that our pre-philosophical singular intuitions about 
objecthood exhaust the data of the theory of composition, then being in accord with 
such intuitions is in some good sense not just a theoretical virtue of an account of 
composition (as conservatism is) – it is something more like an empirical virtue. 
(Kriegel, 2008: 363) 
 
In addition to those who are explicit that they are treating intuitions as of evidential weight, 
there are those who seem to speak implicitly, in the same way. Here is Sider (1996: 463—my 
italics) 
 
we don’t say “here are two coin-shaped objects in the same place”. This talk is clearly 
intended to be literal (as opposed to talk of “the average family”), and is accompanied 
by robust intuitions (“shouldn’t two coin-like things weigh twice as much as one?”.) 
While not decisive, these intuitions create an at least prima facie reason to look for a 
theory that respects them. 
 
This certainly seems like a case where a metaphysician is treating intuitions as evidential—
else why look for a theory that respects our intuitions? Ladyman and Ross themselves cite 
Paul (2004: 172–-my italitcs), who, in discussion of primitivism about the de re properties of 
objects, notes: 
 
A related worry involves the consequences implied by the claim that the lump and the 
statue are not identical: the lump and the statue coincide, so two numerically distinct 
object share their matter and occupy the very same spatiotemporal region. But without 
any explanation, this result is radically counterintuitive, for it seems to contradict our 
usual way of thinking about material objects as individuated by their matter and 
region. 
 
This seems a clear case of a view being counterintuitive and this counting against it. This 
seems to be another case where intuitions are playing the role of evidence to be 
accommodated. Indeed, earlier in the piece, Paul (2004: 171) has already noted that one of 
the key points of her paper is to ‘defend essentialism against the variability of (some of) our 
modal intuitions’. 
 
Lastly, consider Markosian (2008: 360). Markosian considers the special composition 
question that asks us ‘when does composition occur?’4 In considering the various different 
answers that have been put forward in the literature, Markosian produces a table listing the 
various costs and benefits of those views. Throughout the paper, Markosian proceeds by 
arguing that the theory that has the most benefits is to be accepted. Thus, these benefits, are 
playing something like an evidential role. In the ‘Main benefits’ column, there are 7 explicit 
references to intuition. In each case, that a theory ‘fits’, ‘preserves’ or is ‘consistent with’ 
intuition is cited as a benefit. Notably, only 16 benefits are described. Thus, only just under 
half of all of the benefits to be attributed to these philosophical theories by Markosian 
concern the fact that they map particularly well to intuition. These philosophers, who appeal 
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to intuitions as evidence; they are the target of Ladyman and Ross’s arguments. They are the 
subjects of my (partial) defence.  
 
But before we move to that defence, a concern. Dorr (2010), in reviewing Ladyman and 
Ross, says: ‘saying ‘Intuitively, P’ is no more than a device for committing oneself to P while 
signalling that one is not going to provide any further arguments for this claim.’ Zimmerman 
and Kreigel (et al.) are (or so it seems to me) using talk of what is common-sense or intuitive 
as evidence in favour of a particular view. But Dorr has argued that metaphysicians do not 
typically grant evidential weight to intuitions. Dorr’s response to Ladyman and Ross has 
been influential and was endorsed by others. If Dorr is wrong and Ladyman and Ross are 
right, that intuition is taken to be evidential in analytic metaphysics, this needs to be 
established and discussed.
5
 
So, what to say? Well, I’ve cited Kriegel, Paul, Sider, Markosian and Zimmerman as among 
those who appeal to intuitive as evidence, but they may not be representative of 
metaphysicians. If the established methodology of metaphysics involved taking intuitions to 
have some probative force what explains Dorr (and perhaps also others) insistence to the 
contrary? 
By way of response, let me offer three comments. As I’ve already said, the defence here is 
only intended to be of those who do use intuitions as evidence. So, first, I don’t much mind 
whether the view I’m defending here is a little outside the mainstream (though see point 3). 
As is clear from the forgoing, there clearly are those who are invested in the philosophical 
methodology that I’ve described—or, at least, there are those who have practiced it in the 
not-to-recent-past. That methodology seems to be one that explicitly gives evidential weight 
to intuitions. Dorr seems to simply be wrong in the cases I’ve described.  
Second, of those that do in fact cite Dorr’s review, it seems at least some folks think he’s 
wrong on this score. I would echo the response to it given by Maclaurin and Dyke (2011: 
296) 
Cian Dorr [2010] attempts to take the sting out of L&R’s critique of the methodology 
of appealing to intuition, by suggesting that it is not really an argumentative strategy 
at all. Instead, Dorr claims, it is merely a stylistic device for indicating that one is 
assuming some proposition as a premise, and intends to provide no further argument 
for it. If that’s right, Dorr claims, then one can no more criticize it as a methodology 
than one can criticize the methodology of giving arguments that rely on premises. We 
don’t think that all the appeals to intuition that one finds in non-naturalistic 
metaphysics can be characterized in this way. Those that occur in Lewisian style cost-
benefit analyses, for example, do not fit this model. In such analyses two theories are 
compared with respect to a number of theoretical virtues, one of which is the 
preservation of common-sense intuitions. With respect to this particular theoretical 
virtue, the theory that requires us to relinquish the fewest intuitions wins. 
 
It is precisely that Lewisian-style metaphysics that I wish to defend. (Note: I don’t say that 
this is Lewisi’s view. I will happily defer to Lewis-scholars for judgments on exactly how to 
understand Lewis’s view.) My point is that there is a distinctive way of doing metaphysics, 
practiced by the likes of Zimmerman, Sider, Paul, Markosian and Kreigel, recognized here by 
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Maclaurin and Dyke (2011), and that I will try to defend from Ladyman and Ross’s attacks. It 
may be that there are other parts of analytic metaphysics where intuitions are not appealed to 
as having evidential weight; that might explain Dorr’s judgment. But, even if that is so, there 
remains a part of analytic metaphysics that seems to require some defence.  
 
Third, and finally, Kreigel, Markosian Paul, Sider and Zimmerman are, so far as I can tell, in 
the business of practicing mainstream metaphysics. I’m not quite sure how to argue for that 
claim. I don’t know how to determine definitively what counts as ‘mainstream’ and what 
counts as of more parochial interest. Nonetheless, as I understand mainstream metaphysics, 
those philosophers mentioned a moment ago are its practitioners. A defence of their 
approach, as that approach is described in the quotations above, is therefore, a defence of a 
mainstream approach to metaphysics. 
 
The structure of the defence, to which I will now turn, is as follows. To begin, I note 
Ladyman and Ross’s concern with the use of intuition in metaphysics. I consider the response 
that by using intuitions in metaphysics we fare no worse than the scientist who also uses 
intuition in their practices. I register Ladyman and Ross’s claim that this defence fails 
because it’s clear that scientists use ‘intuition’ in only a very limited sense. I argue, through 
consideration of cases, that Ladyman and Ross seem wrong about the range of uses of 
intuition deployed by scientists. I conclude that it is at least an open question as to how 
scientists use intuition and, as such, that it is an open question as to whether or not 
metaphysicians are any worse placed than scientists. I suggest that more needs to be done to 
show that the metaphysician is behaving in an irresponsible fashion. 
2.1 Worries with intuition 
The specific concerns raised by Ladyman and Ross are that these intuitions that are being 
appealed to are a product of our environment and are of value only in a very limited range of 
cases. As they make clear (2007: 11), most of our experiences serve to acquaint us with how 
the world behaves at spatial distances to be measured in a scale ranging from around a 
millimetre to a few thousand miles. Similar remarks can be made about our familiarity with 
temporal durations that are neither particularly short, nor long. Further, our intuition seems to 
have furnished us with a model of reality such that we are surprised when objects behave in 
non-standard ways.  
If our intuitions are effectively only formed in response to goings on at these relatively 
pinched perspectives, and in response to relatively slow-moving and massive macroscopic 
objects, then it is unclear as to why we should think that these intuitions are of any use when 
it comes to discerning the fundamental nature of reality. Since that nature is the target of 
inquiry among contemporary metaphysicians, and since (at least some of) these 
metaphysicians are using intuitions as evidence, the work produced by these metaphysicians 
is of little to no value. Such work is, after all, fundamentally misguided. 
But establishing that intuitions are not of any use in helping us to choose between theories 
about the fundamental structure of reality requires more than this. That my intuitions are 
formed in a domain and about that domain doesn’t mean that they cannot be usefully ported 
to other domains.  
Here is one way that such a ‘porting’ might occur. Suppose that intuitions of the very same 
sort that Ladyman and Ross wish to object to in metaphysics were used in physics. Physics—
like metaphysics—is supposed to uncover the fundamental structure of reality. Ladyman and 
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Ross are of the mind that physics is in good standing. So, were physics to rely upon intuitions 
as evidence, in the way that (at least some parts of) metaphysics seems to, then we should 
either conclude that physics is not in good standing, or else conclude that metaphysics is none 
the worse for treating intuitions as sources of evidence in favour of a particular theory. And 
since the success of physics does not seem to be in question, that would naturally lead us to 
the conclusion that metaphysiscs is in good standing. 
Ladyman and Ross are, however, quite clear that this defence cannot be mounted. It is clear 
to them that the uses of intuition in the sciences are of a very particular type and that this 
lends no support to the metaphysician. Here are Ladyman and Ross (2007: 15) making their 
point. 
We do not deny that intuitions in one sense of the term are important to science. It is 
frequently said of, for example, a good physicist that he or she has sound physical 
intuition. Economists routinely praise one another's ‘economic intuitions’—and 
routinely break the bad news to struggling graduate students that they lack such 
intuitions. However, the meaning of ‘intuitions’ in these uses differs sharply from the 
metaphysician's. The physicist and economist refer to the experienced practitioner's 
trained ability to see at a glance how their abstract theoretical structure probably—in 
advance of essential careful checking—maps onto a problem space. Intuitions in this 
sense have nothing to do with deliverances of putative untrained common sense. 
Furthermore, even the intuitions of the greatest scientist are regarded by other 
scientists as heuristically and not evidentially valuable. 
 
In my view, this argument fails. 
 
2.2 Analysing the argument 
The point being claimed by Ladyman and Ross is empirical. They are claiming that, as a 
matter of fact, scientists do not work in a particular way; scientists do not treat their intuitions 
as evidence. Apparently, no good science is being done by scientists who treat the 
deliverances of common-sense as evidence. Perhaps that’s true. But where is the evidence? It 
is, after all, a claim with very wide scope and within the various sciences there is clearly 
some scope for moderate differences in approach. In the absence of any evidence why should 
we think that Ladyman and Ross are right? I don’t see that a priori speculation could 
establish this point either way. 
One might think that there is a good deal of data available on when scientists use their 
intuition and that this clearly reveals that Ladyman and Ross are quite right about the role 
that intuition plays in physics. After all, the methodology deployed by practicing scientists is 
well studied and well understood. Whatever the findings of these studies, they will surely 
reveal that physicists only use their intuitions in the way that Ladyman and Ross describe. 
This response fails. In point of fact, there isn’t too much work on the role that intuition plays 
at the point of theory evaluation in the sciences. In particular, there isn’t very much literature 
that attempts to systematically track the range of uses to which intuitions are put in all 
sciences.  
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This brings us on to the second point of concern: what the studies actually show. I want to 
consider two different studies that explicitly are focused on intuitions in science, and one 
discussion of ‘gut feelings’. 
2.2.1 Data on intuitions in physics 
One recent study reveals some interesting data, but does not speak in favour of Ladyman and 
Ross’s claims. Indeed, it seems to speak against them. I (Tallant, 2013) track the range of 
uses to which the term ‘intuition’ is put in a range of scientific journals. In that paper I try to 
identify a range of reasonably distinctive uses, including: results being described as intuitive; 
explanations/theories being described as intuitive; pictures being described as intuitive; a 
particular way of thinking about a given subject matter being described as intuitive; cases that 
enable us to gain intuition, and expectations being particularly intuitive. The study also notes 
that there are a very significant number of other uses that don’t fit cleanly into any of these 
categories. 
I think that the data cited in that paper gives us some evidence that Ladyman and Ross speak 
falsely when they claim that the only use to which intuitions are put in the evaluation of 
scientific theories are ‘to see at a glance how their abstract theoretical structure probably—in 
advance of essential careful checking—maps onto a problem space.’ Where Ladyman and 
Ross say that the term applies to scientists and their abilities, it seems from the data that the 
term is frequently applied by scientists to explanations; to pictures; to results. Ladyman and 
Ross appear to simply be wrong in their claims as to how intuitions are used in science. 
2.2.2 Intuitions of Nobel Laureats 
Marton, Fensham and Chaitlin (1992) carried out an ethnographic study of interview data 
from interviews with 83 Nobel Laureats, drawn from physics, chemistry and medicine from 
1976 to 1986. The interviewees had been asked, do you believe in scientific intuition? Of the 
83, 72 explicitly declared that they did or else made comments that took its existence of 
granted. As Fensham and Marton (1992: 115) note, ‘this study supports very strongly the 
importance of intuition in science’.   
What interests us here is the question of how these Laureates thought that scientific intuition 
might be deployed. Is it, as Ladyman and Ross would have us believe, merely that talk of 
‘scientific intuition’ merely refers to the ability of a practitioner to see at a glance how their 
theoretical structure maps onto a problem space? It seems not.  As noted by Fensham and 
Marton (1992: 115), there is talk of abilities. But, as they also note, there are three distinct 
ways in which these Laureates describe using scientific intuitions: ‘As an outcome, intuition 
denotes an idea, a feeling, a thought, or an answer. As an experience, or something that 
happens intuition refers to acts or events. The third use was to individual capabilities. Some 
examples are revealing. 
And so... as we did our work, I think, we almost felt at times that there was almost a 
hand guiding us. Because we would go from one step to the next, and somehow we 
would know which was the right way to go. And I really can’t tell how we knew that, 
how we knew that it was necessary to move ahead [Michael S Brown, winner of the 
Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1985] 
I don’t want to suggest that this is a use of intuition that is the same as that of the 
metaphysician. The very meagre claim that I want to make here is that it is very hard to see 
this as a case in which those in question are talking about the ability of a trained practitioner 
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to see at a glance how their theoretical structure maps onto a problem space. Indeed, the 
description given by Brown almost invites the charge of the process of deploying intuitions 
being mysterious.  
Finally, 
…to me it is a feeling of…’Well, I really don’t believe this result,’ or ‘This is a trivial 
result,’ and ‘This is an important result,’ and ‘Let us follow this path.’ I am not 
always right, but I do have feelings about what is an important observation and what 
is probably trivial.’ [Rita Levi-Montalcini, Medicine, 1986] 
 
Again, this is not a scientist speaking of an ability to see how a model maps onto a problem 
space. This is a scientist speaking of feeling particular ways about particular routes forward 
and particular results. Once more, I don’t claim this to be the same kind of activity as that 
engaged in by the philosopher. Rather, my concern is with showing that Ladyman and Ross 
seem quite wrong to insist that the only use of intuition in science is to talk about the ability 
of someone to see how a model maps onto a problem space. 
Consider one further objection to my point. What the discussion of the Laureats shows is that 
scientists do often appeal to intuition. However, that does not show that intuition is evidential 
as opposed to heuristic. The Nobel prize winners would not be successful scientists if their 
theories only had intuition to support them. In addition to (perhaps) being intuitive theories, 
they were also empirically successful. The result may be that intuition may well play a role in 
the context of discovery but not in the justification for why we should believe our best 
scientific theories.  
I think that the objection is quite right—to a point. Nothing that I’ve said here serves to fully 
disclose whether the use of intuition in science is heuristic or evidential. I agree with that. But 
showing otherwise was not my intention. As noted, my goal here is to show that Ladyman 
and Ross are wrong about the scope of the use of intuitions—that intuitions are merely used 
to see at a glance how their theoretical structure maps onto a problem space. If intuitions are 
also being used as an heuristic, to guide the shape of inquiry, then Ladyman and Ross are 
wrong about the role that intuition plays in science. 
 
2.3 Surveying the scientists
6
 
Most striking of all the data presented here, and of direct relevance as to whether or not 
intuition plays an evidential role in science, is that reported by Martinson, Anderson and de 
Vries (2005). In the course of their research, they surveyed in excess of 3,000 scientists, and 
asked them to (anonymously) confirm or deny that they had taken part a variety of practices, 
including fraud, plagiarism and fabrication. The point most significant to us, however, is that 
in excess of 15% of those who responded admitted to ‘dropping observations or data points 
from analyses based upon a gut feeling that they were inaccurate’.  
This ‘gut feeling’ seems very close to intuition. Somewhat leadingly, these seem to be cases 
where scientists are rejecting particular data because they ‘just seem wrong’. And, in this 
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context, it seems to be the case that this ‘gut feeling’ is playing an evidential role (else why 
drop the data point without further checking?). We should concede, of course, that this is far 
from definitive. But this would seem to be a place in which intuition—or gut feeling—is 
playing an evidential role in theory choice. Gut feeling tells us which data-points are ‘right’ 
and which are not; which data points are ‘right’, of course, determines which theory is 
correct. Thus, ‘gut feeling’ would seem to be playing an evidential role in our theory choice. 
 
2.4 Where does this leave us? 
Caution should be urged here—for two reasons. First, I have only claimed that Ladyman and 
Ross appear wrong. We can claim nothing more than that. As I try to (Tallant, 2013) make 
clear, (2.1) the data provided only gives us a sense of how the term ‘intuitive’ is used by 
scientists in their writings. The data from the Laureates gives us only self-reports (2.2). The 
data on the self-reports (2.3) is in need of further exploration. 
These need not be taken to definitively reveal anything about how intuitions themselves really 
are used by practicing scientists. If we wish to understand how scientists in fact use their 
intuitions, then we will need to engage in much more extensive study, involving a range of 
different approaches. So the very best that we can hope to show here is that what data there is 
suggests that Ladyman and Ross are wrong. 
Second, note that nothing that has been said here establishes what we were looking for on 
behalf of the metaphysician: namely, something that will clearly and obviously help us to 
rehabilitate the use of intuitions in metaphysics. The reason for this, of course, is that we have 
established that what little data there is on the range of ways that scientists use their intuitions 
is unclear.  
Now, though this point may appear initially dispiriting, I think that it ought not to leave us to 
downhearted. Simply, the current data that we have (Tallant, 2013) suggests that there is a 
range of different ways in which intuition appears to be used in physics. It is not at all 
implausible to think that those uses will be found in other disciplines. Perhaps philosophers 
make use of their intuitions in these ways. There may even be other uses of intuitions (in the 
form of ‘gut feelings’) to be found in other sciences. Although the data I’ve presented is 
suggestive, it is far from exhaustive. 
Suppose that’s right. It might then be the case that intuitions are being appealed to as 
evidence—in some way—in a variety of places in the sciences. If that’s right, then it would 
go some way to providing the metaphysician with justification for the methodology outlined 
earlier. Were it to turn out that a complete mapping of the role played by intuitions in science 
included the use of intuitions as evidence in support of a theory, then it would seem much 
harder to object to the metaphysician that they may not also appeal to intuitions as evidence. 
But suppose that we do not find intuitions being used as evidence. What then? Well, this 
presents the metaphysician with an opportunity. Suppose that we can, in these future studies, 
identify the range of ways in which practicing scientists use intuition. Rather than sounding 
the death-knell for contemporary metaphysics, it would likely suggest a profitable way to re-
orientate the philosophical methodology described above. For, as is familiar, there is a 
reasonably venerable tradition of philosophers looking to refocus their methodology along 
the lines of those adopted in the physical sciences. If we are to carry out that project properly, 
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then we will need to have a clear sense of the ways in which those engaged in scientific 
enquiry deploy their intuitions. 
 
2.5 But were they trained? 
However, Ladyman and Ross argue both that scientists' intuitions are the result of an 
assimilation of successful theories and that their intuitions are not treated as evidence. I’ve 
argued only against the latter. But if the former is true then even if the latter is false scientific 
intuitions would of a different standing to metaphysical ones. This is, of course, a question of 
origin. Scientist’s intuitions come from one source (the assimilation of successful theories). 
This is a reliable source. The intuitions of philosophers come from another source: our 
common sense and common experience. This source is far less reliable. 
Once again I think that this argument provided by Ladyman and Ross is suspect. First, we 
require a distinction. I shall refer to ‘trained intuitions’ as the sort of intuition that Ladyman 
and Ross seem to think is used and permitted in scientific inquiry. I shall refer to ‘untrained 
intuitions’ to refer to the deliverances of untrained common sense. 
Nothing that Ladyman and Ross say (2007: 14-15) establishes that physics does not use 
everyday intuition (commmonsense) as a factor to be weighed when judging theories. Rather, 
following Wolpert (1992), they (2007: 14-5) cite some cases where particular scientific 
theories commit us to especially counterintuitive conclusions, but are accepted nonetheless. 
This is supposed to demonstrate that untrained intuitions do not play an evidential role in 
science.  
But the evidence falls short of establishing their conclusion. All that the evidence shows is 
that there are accepted, counterintuitive scientific theories. What is ignored is whether or not 
untrained intuition is considered at the point of theory evaluation. If it is, if it plays some 
non-zero role in determining whether or not a theory is to be accepted, then whether or not a 
counter-intuitive theory is accepted simply isn’t salient here. To repeat: what matters is 
whether or not untrained intuition is considered at all when evaluating a theory. And, once 
more, there is no data yet available that will conclusively decide the matter either way. 
In that case, the way forward for contemporary metaphysics does not look all that bleak. 
Either, look to the use of intuition in science as a form of justification for the use of intuition 
in metaphysics (perhaps helping metaphysicians to acquire ‘trained’ intuitions), or modify the 
metaphysical method in light of a future data-set from the study of science—perhaps 
requiring us to see intuitions as of mere heuristic value, or perhaps as something more 
evidential. At the current time, however, we have some reason to think that intuitions are 
used in a range of different ways in the sciences. We have no data at all that looks to rule out 
the possibility of there being science done in such a way that untrained intuitions are playing 
an evidential role. It is, then, hard to see how to sustain the line taken by Ladyman and Ross 
that the role of untrained intuitions in science is clearly and obviously distinct from the role 
of untrained intuitions in metaphysics. 
3. Wither peer review?
7
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Ladyman and Ross insist that science involves collective and institutional processes. 
Ladyman and Ross argue that these processes exist precisely to wash out the effects of 
differing intuitions of individual scientists. The issue is whether scientific disputes about 
theory choice are settled by appeal to intuitions and citing evidence of scientists using the 
term does not amount to that especially since Ladyman and Ross themselves mention that 
trained scientific intuition is an important component of scientific thought. 
A brief digression into some of the kinds of institutional filters that are at work in the 
sciences might one extremely sceptical of the claim that such filters plays the role of weeding 
out intuitions. Let’s consider just three concerns. 
First, for the most part, scientific journals do not practice double-blind peer review.
8
 
However, at least one study (Budde et al. 2008) found that double-blind peer review 
significantly increases the chance that work published by female authors will be accepted for 
publication. Peer review not being anonymous appears to allow significant gender bias’s to 
effect the outcome of review. If such bias’s are present in the peer review process, it’s hard to 
put too much stock in peer review as a means through which to weed out the judgments of 
individual scientists—where those judgments may reflect gender-bias, common-sense, 
intuitions, etc. Certainly, what is clear from this particular study is that the institutional 
process constituted by peer-review and publication is quite significantly effected by cognitive 
processes not introspected as present by those involved in the peer review process. If gender 
bias demonstrably plays a role in peer review, I do not see that we have any grounds to rule 
out the possibility that intuition is playing a significant role in the peer review process. 
Second, studies within the psychological literature have demonstrated that confirmation bias 
is a genuine phenomena; it is the tendency to seek or evaluate evidence in ways that are 
partial to current beliefs and theories. There are studies that suggest that confirmation bias is 
present in significant cases in the history of science.
9
 We know, then, that confirmation bias 
is a genuine issue in scientific inquiry. Again, if this kind of cognitive bias is in play during 
the peer review process, then it would seem unreasonable to think that the intuition of the 
reviewer might not also be in play.
10
 
Third, there is some suspicion that the increased professionalization in science has led to 
quite serious issues. For instance, Anderson et al. 2007, record some of the ways in which 
practicing scientists describe the peer review process being consciously manipulated in the 
self-interest of the reviewer (and of this practice being ubiquitous), and Fanelli (2010) 
describes quantitative data that is consistent with the hypothesis that increased 
professionalization in science leads to increase in bias (in research and review). 
There is, therefore, some evidence that the peer-review process preserves some unconscious 
bias’s and is prone, in at least some cases, to being manipulated to the ends of the reviewer. It 
is hard, I think, to view such an institution as one where the intuitions of scientists might not 
get some grip. If both conscious and unconscious biases of reviewers are demonstrably 
present, why not also their intuitions? 
                                                 
8
 The review process is ‘double blind’ iff the identity of the reviewers is kept from the authors and the identity 
of the author is kept from the reviewers.   
9
 See, inter alia, Nickersen (1998). 
10
 In fact, current journal practices might be thought to exacerbate the phenoma in view of the advice given to 
reviewers by (e.g. Nature  2014):  ‘Authors of papers that blow against the prevailing winds bear a far greater 
burden of proof than normally expected in publishing their challenge to the current paradigm.’  
11 
At the current time we have some reasons (given in sections 2.1-2.3) to think that intuitions 
are used in a range of different ways in the sciences. We have no data at all that looks to rule 
out the possibility of there being science done in such a way that untrained intuitions are 
playing an evidential role. If we wish to advance Ladyman and Ross’s case further, we must 
have that evidence.  
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